学院各支部:
时政译坛是我院的党建品牌建设项目,在学院领导和资深教师的大力支持,广大党员的广泛参与下,自2009年以来,已成功举办九期。时政译坛以加强党员时政教育为要义,以强化学生翻译技能训练为宗旨,为高翻学院全体党员提供了翻译实训的良好平台。根据学院党委的工作安排,兹定于10月31日至11月22日在全院学生党员中开展第十期“时政译坛”翻译竞赛活动,现将有关工作通知如下。
一、本次活动参赛对象:高翻学院全体党员(包括预备党员)、入党积极分子
二、本次活动形式:中译英、英译中(可任选一项,也可两项都参加)。
三、本次活动原文:见附件(翻译红体字部分即可)
四、参赛规则
1.参赛原文将发布在翻译学院网页上,供大家下载,比赛无需报名,请参赛同学于2016年11月22日晚12:00之前将译文(word文件,文件名:班级+姓名,以附件形式)发送至邮箱:332780993@qq.com即可。参赛译文一律用小四号字,中文用宋体,英文用Times New Roman,并请注明班级、姓名、性别及联系方式。参赛译文一次投稿有效,恕不接收修改稿。
2.参赛译文须独立完成,杜绝抄袭现象,一经发现,将取消参赛资格,并通知所在支部严肃批评教育。译文应尽量在语言和风格上忠实于原文,语言通顺,逻辑清晰,无语言错误。
3.由教师党员对译文进行评审,中译英和英译中各评出一等奖、二等奖、三等奖。获奖名单将于12月初公布,届时召开颁奖典礼,由党员教师评委将对获奖译文进行点评,并颁发获奖证书及奖品。获奖译文亦将择优刊登在学院网页“翻译工作坊”栏目,以供学习借鉴。
特此通知
主办:高级翻译学院党委
承办:高级翻译学院16级研究生翻译学党支部
2016年10月31日
附录:翻译原文
China's forbidden babies still an issue
Why China's two-child policy still doesn't go far enough for some families. It is not often that people hiding from the authorities agree to give interviews to the media. Especially in China. But after a series of phone calls I meet just such a man, anxious and on edge, but still determined to tell his story. He is not a criminal, or a dissident, or a government whistle-blower. In fact his particular misdemeanour would, anywhere else in the world, be considered a cause for pride and joy. He is hiding, along with the rest of his family, for the simple reason that his wife has just given birth to their third child. "A third baby is not allowed," he tells me, "so we are renting a home away from our village.
All Chinese couples are now allowed to have two children. The local government carries out pregnancy examinations every three months. If we weren't in hiding, they would have forced us to have an abortion."
One year ago this week, China announced that what had become perhaps the most widely recognised symbol of Communist Party rule - the one-child policy - was to be scrapped. It has been replaced instead with a new, universal two-child policy that took effect on 1 January this year. The old policy - introduced in 1979 to tackle what policymakers saw as the impending crisis of overpopulation - is estimated by the government to have prevented up to 400 million births, in part through the now well-documented use of forced abortions and sterilisations.
So it is little wonder that the mere relaxing of the limit on family size, from one child to two, has done little to assuage the fears of those who fall foul of the new rule.
To mark the first anniversary of the announcement, we set out to investigate what the new policy really means in practice. And what we have discovered suggests that the brutal machinery of enforcement is still in place along with the Chinese state's insistence on the right of control over women's wombs. In a grey suburb of a non-descript city in eastern China, I walk, uninvited into one of the notorious family planning centres. It's a cold, gloomy place the like of which can be found in towns and villages the length and breadth of this vast country. The floor plan at the entrance adds to the sense of unease. It shows that this shabby, run-down building contains two ultrasound rooms and three operating theatres. And when I ask one of the senior officials in charge whether those theatres have ever been used to carry out forced abortions, he pauses.
A boy sits on his father's shoulders as they pose for a photograph in front of the giant portrait of late Chinese chairman Mao Zedong on the Tiananmen Gate, in Beijing, China, October 2, 2011. The age of the one-child family is officially over, but the state is still in charge "Very few," he finally replies, before going on to insist that none have taken place for "at least 10 years." Where else in the world would you find a government official admitting that his colleagues have kidnapped, drugged and forcibly operated on women, no matter how long ago? Where else would the qualifier "very few" be considered an acceptable alternative to an outright denial? It is an illustration of how the one-child policy has bent and blurred the moral lines and made such state-sponsored violence seem unexceptional. The official tells me that in his district, under the new two-child policy all women of childbearing age are required to report for two ultrasound examinations every year.
Many families now choose to have just one child. Those found to be pregnant with a third baby "will be advised accordingly", he says. To get a sense of the wider reality, I ask a female colleague to telephone a number of family planning centres at random. Pretending to be a mother, pregnant with her third baby but wanting to keep it, she asks the officials what her options are. According to Chinese law the only legal sanction available to the state for a woman violating the family planning laws is a large fine. And, as all the officials we speak to on the phone make clear, with the change in policy from one to two children, the fine remains firmly in place. Levied at up to 10 times annual average income, these fines are often enough in themselves to act as a powerful disincentive to continue with the pregnancy. But our research shows officials going further, engaging in coercive home visits with the aim of "persuading" women to have abortions.
"If you're reported to us, then we'll find you and we'll persuade you not to give birth to that baby," one said. "We'll definitely find you and persuade you to do an abortion," said another. When asked whether our hypothetical mother might actually face physical force, rather than just heavy persuasion, one official said it was still possible "in principle". Another, in answer to the same question, said: "It's hard to say." And when asked if a woman could just have the baby and pay the fine yet another official answered: "No. You just can't."
China's one-child policy was scrapped, not out of the recognition that a woman should be free to choose what she does with her own body and her own fertility, but because the Communist Party finally woke up to the economic consequences of the falling birth rate. The irony is that the two-child policy is too little too late - not enough women are choosing to have even a second baby. That means of course that the pool of people wanting a third child will be even smaller again and some officials we spoke to seemed relatively indifferent, perhaps resigned to their diminishing power in the face of such arithmetic.
"If you want to give birth to your baby, just go ahead," one said, although he was still at pains to stress that the fine would have to be paid.
Our survey is not scientific of course, but it does offer a glimpse into a system that remains rigid and dogmatic. We found no evidence, no admission, of a forced abortion being carried out since the introduction of the two-child policy, but the threat is clearly still there.
"We don't have the money for the fine. We just don't know what to do," the father tells me. But does he regret it? "When I look at our new baby, I feel happy," he says.
人民币入SDR:龙门一跃还是骑虎难下?
今年10月1日人民币正式纳入SDR篮子。正如笔者早前文章中所提,人民币首次纳入SDR篮子,比重便超越日元与英镑,位列第三,充分表达了IMF对于五年来中国金融改革的肯定,且人民币入篮对于全球货币体系调整也是里程碑事件,预示着未来世界各国人民币作为储备货币的比重将进一步提升。从这个角度来说,人民币入篮对于人民币国际化目标实为龙门一跃。
然而,自去年IMF宣布人民币加入SDR的决定以来的近一年内,又出现了一个超预期的情况,即由于美联储开启历史性加息与人民币两度汇改,人民币贬值压力空前加大。在此背景下,资本外流态势明显,外汇储备从2014年中历史高点至今下降了约8000亿美元,以至于其后不得不采取稳汇率手段,甚至通过重拾部分资本管制,以扭转预期。因此,有质疑认为,这样的举措,与人民币国际化目标相悖,也意味着人民币国际化目标或将面临反转,是骑虎难下的表现。
如何看待人民币入篮的历史意义?其对于人民币国际化目标而言究竟是龙门一跃,还是骑虎难下?
......
在今年中国引领的G20杭州峰上就建设有效的全球经济金融治理架构,继续改善关于资本流动的分析、监测和对资本流动过度波动带来风险的管理达成一致;同时,IMF对今年10月1日人民币正式加入SDR篮子表示欢迎,均说明国际社会对于中国防范金融风险举措的认可。
因此,笔者认为当前人民币国际化进程中遭遇的挑战不应该使中国的金融市场开放倒退,相反,在人民币顺利入篮后,应该克服人民币汇率波动的恐慌情绪,把握时机,扩大人民币汇率浮动区间,大力推动国内的市场化改革与金融市场开放,比如加速中美投资协定以及开放国内债券市场。同时确保经济基本面的稳定、防范房地产泡沫,以及加速推动国企改革。只有这样,才能使人民币成功加入SDR不致陷入骑虎难下的局面,反而是龙门一跃,成为中国融入甚至引领国际金融体系的推进器。